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Sellars, Realism, and Kantian Thinking 
Willem A. deVries, University of New Hampshire 
 
This essay is a response to Patrick Reider’s essay “Sellars on Perception, Science and 
Realism: A Critical Response.” Reider is correct that Sellars’s realism is in tension with 
his generally Kantian approach to issues of knowledge and mind, but I do not think 
Reider’s analysis correctly locates the sources of that tension or how Sellars himself 
hoped to be able to resolve it. Reider’s own account of idealism and the reasons 
supporting it are rooted in the epistemological tradition that informed the British 
empiricists, rather than in the metaphysical reasons that ruled within the German tradition 
from Leibniz through Hegel that has much more in common with Sellars’s position. 
Thus, Reider takes Sellars’s notion of picturing to be just another version of the 
representationalism that has dominated the Anglo-American tradition since Locke, 
whereas, in my view, because picturing is a non-semantical relation, it is an important 




Reider starts off, appropriately, with a discussion of analogy and science in Sellars’s 
thought. The target here is correct, but the discussion goes awry in some important ways. 
This is most directly seen in Reider’s speaking as if Sellars wants to exploit something 
like a Thomistic “analogy of proportion,” when, in fact, Sellars is claiming that the kinds 
of analogies he’s exploiting, unlike the Thomistic version, offers us “new determinate 
concepts” [my emphasis], rather than an allusion to something of some general nature 
whose specific reality remains beyond our ken. 
 
Granted, there is something like a Thomistic analogy of proportion in play when, in the 
midst of his analysis of perception, Sellars tells us that “sheer phenomenology or 
conceptual analysis takes us part of the way” in understanding sensory episodes, namely, 
“to the point of assuring us that  
 
Something, somehow a cube of pink in physical space is present in the 
perception other than as merely believed in (SSOP §26: 89).” 
 
This result yields, like a Thomistic analogy of proportion, a highly indeterminate concept 
of what is present to us in the perception: something that is somehow a colored, shaped 
object in physical space. However, for our purposes the main point is that scientific 
theorizing goes far beyond this; eventually, it will develop a determinate conception of 
what is present in the perception and how it can manage to be colored and shaped, that is, 
what properties it has that are counterparts to the properties of the physical objects that 
normally cause such sensory states. This will be a family of determinate concepts of 
sensa. 
 
There are two significantly different forms in which Sellars thinks analogies can lead to 
new determinate concepts. One is a matter of analogical relations between sets or families 
of concepts. Scientists use such analogies to generate new conceptual schemes that might 
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prove explanatorily useful and be subject to empirical test. So, for instance, around the 
turn of the 20th century, after the discovery of the electron, J. J. Thomson proposed the 
“plum pudding” model to explain the structure of the atom, which was fairly quickly 
replaced by the Rutherford “planetary” model, which was then quantized by Bohr. 
Analogies to plum puddings and solar systems enabled scientists to think about the 
objects they were investigating and the principles that might explain their behavior by 
using concepts of domains with which we were already familiar. This facilitated the 
development of new tests that drove the scientists to new models. Sellars has this kind of 
analogy in mind when he argues, as he did in so many places, that our mentalistic 
concepts are formed by means of such an analogy, and in fact, by two different analogies. 
One likens our intentional states to episodes of ‘inner speech’, the other likens our 
sensory states to ‘inner replicas.’ 
 
The second significant form of analogy that Sellars considers is based on an isomorphism 
between two domains of objects and their relations (as opposed to concepts and their 
relations). When the objects and their relations in one domain bear a useful isomorphism 
to those in some other, nominally different domain, Sellars often speaks of “counterpart 
properties and relations.” We can find at least two or three different places where Sellars 
claims that such an isomorphism plays an important role. One is in the analysis of the 
sensory domain, where our sensory states exhibit counterpart properties to those 
exhibited by the manifest image sensory objects they are typically caused by, and are 
arranged in a scheme that involves counterparts of spatial and temporal relations (SM I 
¶74). The other is in Sellars’s difficult notion of picturing. Some tokens of a linguistic 
type (what Sellars calls a “natural linguistic object”) picture some objects in nature in 
virtue of participating in a complex system of such natural linguistic objects that, in 
virtue of an unimaginably complex projection relation, is isomorphic (in certain respects) 
to the worldly objects thus pictured. 
 
Notice, these two forms of analogy occur at different levels, one is purely within the 
conceptual realm, the other between objects. It is important not to confuse the two, 
though that can be easy to do, since wherever there is an isomorphism between objects an 
analogy between the relevant concepts of those objects will be available. Reider 
sometimes writes as if Sellars thought that representation depended not only on 
analogies, but analogies of proportion.  
 
Any truth that one can glean from a stick figure representing a man lies in 
our ability to understand the differences, i.e., the ‘proportional relation,’ 
between the representation and the actual person. Sellars believes that 
science can help us establish the proportional differences between our 
representations and reality by developing new and better schematizations 
(Reider 41). 1 
 
                                                
1 Editor’s Note: Page numbers for quotes from Reider’s article “Sellars on Perception, Science, and 
Realism: A Critical Response” can be found in the PDF version of: Reider Patrick J. 2012. “Sellars on 
Perception, Science, and Realism: A Critical Response.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 
2 (1): 39-56. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-B8 Accessed: 16 December 2012. 
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But this seems to me a confusion: For one thing, it sounds like representation depends on 
a relatively simple geometric projection relation, the way perspective drawings represent 
spatial objects. That is not a recognizably Sellarsian thought, because it seems to hark 
back to the old and awful theory that representation is a matter of resemblance. Bringing 




Reider is led further off base by faulty characterizations of logical positivism and 
scientific instrumentalism. He characterizes logical positivism as “the belief that all 
existents are material objects persisting in determinable points in time and space” (41), 
but this confuses logical positivism with a kind of materialism. The logical positivists 
were originally committed sense-datum theorists who believed that material objects were 
logical constructions from ontologically and epistemologically prior sense data. It is only 
in the late ‘30s and thereafter that the positivists came around to the view that the 
physical-thing language is basic. Logical positivism is better identified as a philosophical 
approach that accepted the anti-metaphysical, science-idolizing notions of classical 
positivism and combined them with a high regard for the advances in logic of the early 
20th century. Verificationism was the logical positivists’ bulwark against metaphysical 
excess, until that doctrine self-destructed in the ‘30s. 
 
Reider claims that instrumentalism denies that theories can “pertain to or accurately 
account for the individual and discrete nature of material objects and occurrences” simply 
because theories are general and material objects are not. He even argues that 
instrumentalists hold that general claims are incapable of being true or false. But this 
misconstrues instrumentalism. For one thing, it would mean instrumentalism would apply 
even to observation-level empirical generalizations. Surely a general but easily 
observable claim such as “All the coins in my hand are pennies” is capable of truth or 
falsehood and, indeed, of being known to be true or false. Reider’s characterization 
cannot account for the fact that central to the instrumentalists is the distinction between 
the observable and the unobservable, for this distinction does not track any distinction 
between the general and the particular. (Observation is not always of particulars; I can 
just see that all the coins in my hand are pennies.) In the eyes of the instrumentalist, 
observability afforded assurance of metaphysical solidity; unobservability puts it in 
doubt. 
 
What is of central concern to instrumentalism is the ontological status of so-called 
‘theoretical entities’: objects, events, and states that are unobservable (at least in the 
current state of science) but postulated to exist by an explanatory scientific theory. Our 
evidence for the existence of such theoretical entities must itself come back down to 
observable objects, events, and states. The instrumentalist is skeptical enough to wonder, 
then, whether we have the right to believe in the existence of any such entities 
unavailable to direct inspection, and decides that we really do not. The apparatus of our 
theories, including any mention they make of theoretical entities such as electrons or 
quarks, serves merely as a grand calculational device. The only serious ontological 
commitments made by theories that postulate unobservables are to the existence of the 
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observable entities involved in the evidence for and the corroboration of the claims and 
results of the theory. 
 
The instrumentalist, from our point of view, is one who holds that 
theoretical statements of all kinds, including singular statements, are 
essentially instruments for generating statements in the observation 
framework. Thus, if he went along with our distinctions he would hold that 
(ampliative) theoretical statements are simply more sophisticated 
instruments which along with molecular, quantified and law-like 
statements in the observation framework are means of constructing 
observation framework pictures of objects and events (SM V §82: 144). 
 
Reider claims that “Sellars takes a quasi-instrumentalist stance” (42). But this is a 
misunderstanding of Sellars’s admission that “a correct account of matter-of-factual truth, 
even at the perceptual level, must contain “instrumentalist” components” (SM V, §81: 
143). What I think Sellars has in mind here is that theories and conceptual frameworks of 
all kinds “can be fruitfully compared to instruments” (loc. cit.). This, he points out, “is 
true even of the conceptual framework of common sense” (loc. cit.). While Sellars readily 
admitted that the fundamental metaphor behind instrumentalism — that theories are tools 
— is correct, he was an implacable foe of instrumentalism in any more full-bodied sense. 
Since the tool metaphor is applicable to any theory or conceptual framework (this is part 
of Sellars’s pragmatism), he relocates the fundamental issue in the debate between 
instrumentalist and realist into new territory; namely, “whether basic singular statements 
(in a sense to be defined) in the language of such a theory can meaningfully be said to 
“correspond” to the world in the “picture” sense of ‘correspond’” (loc. cit.). 
 
So Reider correctly understands the significance of picturing as the key to Sellars’s 
defense of realism. He also correctly reminds the reader that Sellarsian picturing is not a 
kind of visualization or imagination. But his positive characterization of picturing points 
in us in the wrong direction. Reider says “when we ‘picture’ what something is like, we 
can use relevant sensory content and apply such content in a manner that is compatible 
with scientific theories” (42). But I don’t think it makes sense, using Sellars’s notion of 
picturing, to speak of picturing what something is like, at least as the “what it is like” 
phrase is used today. Reider’s description also makes it sound as if picturing is something 
that we do with conscious intent tied to scientific theorizing. Sellars’s discussion of 
picturing in SM thus needs to be read with extreme care, so I’d like to review a few of the 
basic claims made there about picturing.  
 
First, picturing is a natural, empirical relation (an isomorphism) between objects. “What 
something is like” (whatever it is) is not an object, thus not suitable fodder for picturing. 
Second, the existence of a picturing relation between “natural linguistic objects” (or their 
mental counterparts “natural intentional objects”) and objects in the world is, in Sellars’s 
view, a transcendental requirement on the empirical meaningfulness of the language or 
conceptual framework. This is just as true of the conceptual framework and language of 
the manifest image as it is of the eventual scientific image. Hence there is no special 
connection between picturing and science. The language(s) of highly advanced science(s) 
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will, indeed, bear a different picturing relation to the world from the language of common 
sense; it will be a much finer grained picture than that of common language, but both 




There are also problems with Reider’s interpretation of the notion of a perceptual taking. 
To begin with, when he says that “What makes perceptual takings a special kind of 
representation is that they represent one subject, despite the fact that we are always 
experiencing a succession of appearances” (44), Reider speaks too loosely. There is a 
perfectly good sense in which every intuitive and conceptual representation represents 
one subject, despite the fact that we are always experiencing a succession of appearances, 
for concepts are representations of the unity of a succession of appearances. What 
distinguishes perceptual takings and the Kantian intuitions Sellars wants to illuminate via 
the comparison is the fact that they combine the characteristics of (1) unifying the 
(successive) manifold of sensation in a single representation and (2) relating immediately 
to the object so represented. 
 
Reider goes further off the mark, however, when he asserts that “The non-perspectival 
representation of the house is an instance of what Sellars call a ‘perceptual taking’”(44). 
Perceptual takings are clearly, in Sellars’s view, always perspectival. Consider the 
examples Sellars gives of paradigm perceptual takings: 
 
I do not simply perceptually accept a house; the content of my perceptual 
acceptance is something like  
 
this house over there facing me left-edge-of-front-wise (KTI ¶45 in 
KTM: 435). 
 
Or as Sellars himself pulls his points together: 
 
The object of a perceptual representing of a house is the non-perspectival 
content house; yet as the sort of item that can be the object of a perceptual 
representing, it must provide rules for explaining (together with other 
factors) why such and such sequences of perceptual takings with 




The essential structure of the content of perceptual takings is not just  
 
house from a certain geometrical point of view  
 
but, to make a complicated point in a simple way,  
 
house in front of my sightful eyes  
ship in water moving to the left of my sightful eyes.  
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In my argument I have thinned out this mutual involvement of object, 
circumstances and embodied perceiver into a ghostly ‘object from a point 
of view’ (KTI ¶51 in KTM: 436-7). 
 
Or, from a different essay: 
 
A perceptual believing in [i.e., a perceptual taking] would be illustrated by 
the subject constituent of the believing expressed by  
 
This red brick facing me edgewise is too large to fit that gap 
(SRPC ¶22, in KTM: 454). 
 
What is non-perspectival is the house itself, which is the thing taken, though not the 
taking of it. 
 
…[I]f the total content of a perceptual act is point-of-viewish, it is because 
it is the content of a perceptual act. Thus, while the content house is not a 
point-of-viewish content, it explains (together with certain other factors) 
why such and such perceptual representings with contents which can be 




take place. Thus, the concept of a house as a perceptible object essentially 
involves a reference to perceptual acts, i.e., to the perceptual takings of a 
perceiver (KTI ¶49, in KTM: 436). 
 
This misunderstanding of the nature of a perceptual taking becomes doubly dangerous 
when it is combined with another thesis that Reider seems committed to. After discussing 
the ways in which objects differ from perspectival views of objects, he maintains that 
“any particular perspective cannot accurately ‘represent’ a mind-independent object. This 
is the case, because vantage-points are the products of the observing subject and should 
therefore not be confused with the mind-independent object” (44). Few philosophers 
would be tempted to confuse a vantage-point with an object, but there is a deeper worry 
here.  
 
Reider infers that perspectival views of an object cannot “accurately ‘represent’” (44) 
(Why the quotes around ‘represent’?) it, because (1) the object has many sides, while the 
perspectival view shows only one; (2) the object is not foreshortened, while the 
perspectival view is; (3) “in brief, mind-independent entities are not the facing side of the 
object we are looking at” (44). The inference Reider makes thus seems to rely on the 
notion that an accurate representation of an object duplicates the object itself. But surely 
the representation ‘relation’ is neither some form of identity relation nor even any kind of 
resemblance relation. If part of his argument that Sellars is trapped in a form of idealism 
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rests on the notion that representing reality would require a duplication of reality ‘in the 




The section of his paper in which Reider discusses Sellars’s criticism of Kant’s treatment 
of space and time is undermined by several misconceptions or misinterpretations of 
Sellars’s text. Let’s briefly set the context. Kant thought that space and time are the forms 
of receptivity, entirely dependent on our constitution. Therefore, he concluded, any object 
that appears in space and time must be ideal, itself also dependent on our constitution and 
thus not the thing as it is in itself. Sellars thinks that Kant missed a significant distinction 
between the forms of sensibility strictly so-called, which would pertain to “the 
characteristics of the representations of receptivity as such” (that is, as sensations), from 
the space and time in which our conceptual representations (including our intuitions) 
locate their objects. Roughly, Kant needed to better distinguish the phenomenal space and 
time that psychologists (even transcendental psychologists) can investigate from the 
space and time about which physicists develop theories. Physicists, Sellars contends, are 
free to develop a theory of space-time that is in principle quite independent of the 
peculiarities of the constitution of human sensibility. The constitution of space-time can 
be teased away from our subjective experience and grounded in objective experimental 
results that do not rely in any direct way on the peculiarities of our subjective 
constitution. Differently constituted beings investigating the world would, in principle, 
come to the same theory of space-time as us. That earns the theory the right to claim to be 
a description of the real, of things as they are in themselves. 
 
Reider thinks that Sellars supports his view that ideally good theories describe reality 
with a clearly question-begging argument. But the argument he attributes to Sellars could 
not be Sellars’s own, for it ignores or misinterprets a number of crucial Sellarsian 
distinctions. The first one I want to focus on here distinguishes “the perception of a 
sequence from a mere sequence of perceptions” (SM Appendix ¶11: 232). According to 
Reider, “In this passage, Sellars distinguishes between the succession that occurs in mind-
independent existence and the mental succession found in perceptual experience” (48). 
Then he attributes a fairly simple but bad argument to Sellars: that mental succession 
depends on (is possible only because of) the mind-independent succession, so time is not 
just a form of intuition. But this is not what Sellars (or Kant) is doing at all. 
 
What is Sellars up to? A mere sequence of perceptions is, in one sense, mental, for it is a 
sequence of mental states. Sellars’s own example is the perception of a whiz followed by 
the perception of bang. But this is a sequence in actual time; it is an actual succession. 
The perception of a sequence, however, is a unitary state of mind, and, as a single item, is 
not itself successive. It represents a sequence; a sequence is part of its intentional content. 
There is no actual succession, but only a represented succession. Sellars always 
emphasized in his Kant course that Kant’s predecessors, with their unsophisticated 
conception of ideational composition, tended to think that one represented a complex 
object via a complex of ideas. But it just isn’t true. A simple representation, say, a proper 
name, can represent something complex. In the other direction, a sequence of 
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representations is not thereby a representation of a sequence; an array of representations 
is not thereby a representation of an array. Notice, this is a point about the semantic 
relationships among our representations, and by no means directly about our relations to 
‘external reality’. 
 
Reider thinks Sellars simply assumes that any conceptualization of succession must be 
caused by some actual, non-mental succession, thus assuming realism rather than 
vindicating it. In order to explain the succession of mental states according to Reider’s 
version of Sellars, we have to assume that there are physical successions responsible for 
them. Notice how very unSellarsian this argument is. It assumes the distinctively 
Cartesian notion that we have prior access to our mental states and their relations, which 
in turn we explain by reference to physical states and relations.  
 
Sellars emphatically rejects the Cartesian conception that we have prior (and better) 
access to our own mental states and their relations. This is one of the places where 
reading Sellars on Kant becomes very difficult, because Kant remains to a not 
insignificant degree under the spell of the Cartesian conception. Kant may have thought 
— at least at times — that we do have some prior access to our mental states and their 
relations, and thus may countenance the general idea of an argument from our knowledge 
of the mental to knowledge of so-called ‘external’ reality. But it is clear that this view is 
not compatible with the 2nd edition refutation of idealism. The accusations that the first 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason was just warmed over Berkeley forced Kant to 
clarify his position. For Sellars, however, this Cartesian viewpoint is a nonstarter. His 




Reider’s whole discussion seems framed by the Cartesian assumptions — the “new way 
of ideas” — that Kant came to reject and Sellars sought to dismantle. Reider’s Hegel, for 
instance, sounds much more like Bishop Berkeley than the Hegel I know and love. Notice 
that what Sellars says he wants to avoid is, not Hegel, but “the dialectic which leads from 
Hegel’s Phenomenology to nineteenth-century idealism” (SM I ¶40: 16). What Sellars 
really wants to avoid is Bradley and Bosanquet. Reider attributes to Hegel the claim that 
“only human consciousness and its varied contents are knowable,” (50) and I’d like to see 
the textual basis for that attribution. As far as I can see, the claim is either trivial 
(equivalent to the claim that we can know only what we can think about) or it makes hash 
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature as well as of any knowledge of the Absolute, for neither 
Nature nor the Absolute are themselves contents of human consciousness, except in the 
trivial sense that they are things we can think about. I have argued elsewhere that Hegel 
and Sellars are not nearly so much at odds as one might think, and others have echoed 
this claim.2 So I will not linger over these issues here. Rather, I return to thinking about 
the role of picturing in Sellars’s theory. 
                                                
2 See, e.g., “Sense-Certainty and the ‘This-Such’” Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide. 
Cambridge Critical Guides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 63-75; “Getting Beyond 
Idealisms” in Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity and Realism: Essays on the Anniversary of 
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” W. A. deVries, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 
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Let me boil down what I think is wrong with Reider’s reading of Sellars. He would make 
of Sellarsian pictures a “veil of ideas” that we cannot get beyond. Like an “external world 
skeptic” he argues, roughly, as follows: 
 
We know our pictures. 
We have no reason to think that our pictures are like, resemble, or are 
analogous to anything extra-pictorial (things in themselves).  
So our pictures cannot afford us any knowledge of things in themselves.  
 
Thus, Reider sees Sellars as committed to an epistemologically-based idealism. I have 
argued against any such reading of Sellars in my “Getting Beyond Idealisms,” and I do 
not want to repeat those arguments here, but I would like to point out why Reider’s 
picturing-focused version does not gain traction. 
 
Reider starts his argument against Sellars by claiming that “Sellars’ method for knowing 
the thing-in-itself is ‘picturing’.” (52) This cannot be right. According to Sellars, the 
method that leads us to knowledge of things in themselves is science. Picturing is not a 
method at all, nor is it essentially connected to science itself. As we’ve seen, picturing is 
a transcendental condition on the empirical applicability of any conceptual framework. 
Furthermore, picturing can’t be the method involved in science, because science and its 
commonsense ancestor has been around for millennia, whereas the conception of 
picturing is a relatively late acquisition developed in the attempt to comprehend 
naturalistically how our thoughts and theories engage with the world of which they are a 
part. 
 
Reider then claims the Sellars’s argument insists that we know things in themselves by 
knowing our pictures and then (and independently) drawing an inference by analogy to 
the nature of those things. This is where he treats pictures as similar to the “veil of ideas” 
that early modern thinkers had so much difficulty getting out from behind. But, of course, 
the ‘picture’ Reider employs of the role of pictures is faulty. We do not independently 
construct pictures of chunks of the world and then notice (to our surprise?) that there is an 
analogy between them and reality. Rather, paying attention to evidence and orchestrating 
one’s responses to it in accordance with appropriate rules enables one to produce maps or 
pictures of chunks of space-time that can be employed in devising or controlling further 
activity. For the most part, the pictures that we produce while employing the manifest 
framework are produced unconsciously. They belong in the animal representational 
system that we employ unconsciously on a minute-by-minute basis to modulate our 
behavioral responses to the flood of sensory information we constantly receive. The 
accuracy of those maps or pictures is vindicated by the success of the activities based on 
them.  
 
                                                
211-45. For others, see Terry Pinkard, “Sellars the Post-Kantian” in The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays 
on Wilfrid Sellars. Michael P. Wolf and Mark Norris Lance, eds. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science and the Humanities, 93 Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2006: 21-52. 
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The central point here is that these pictures are not, in the first instance, objects of 
knowledge from which we inferentially derive beliefs about things in themselves. Rather, 
pictures enable our engagement with the world around us. Once language evolved, the 
first-order atomic statements that occur within a system of such statements that bear a 
picturing relation to the world are expressions of our knowledge of things in that world. 
They do not function as independent premises about a picture for an analogical inference 
to a further, distinct claim about what there is and how things relate; rather, they embody 
our current best knowledge of what there is and how things relate. They are actively 
involved in the modulation of our behavior in the pursuit of our goals. Even so, directly 
inferring how things in themselves are from any stage of our conceptualization of the 
world short of the Peircean ideal would be a mistake. For it is only in the Peircean ideal 
that such statements express, not merely ‘best knowledge,’ but final knowledge, 
knowledge that never fails to be vindicated. Action guided by such an ideal map of the 
world will never be ill-guided. As Hegel himself would say, knowledge that is not of 
things as they are in themselves is not knowledge at all. The important point remains that 
we do not know things by first constructing a picture and then inferring from that how 
things are; rather, we know how things are (in part) by representing them in ways that 
conform to the requirements of picturing.  
 
Reider asserts that Sellars “merely assumes that the manner in which the mind maps or 
pictures spatial relations is analogous to mind-independent reality” (53). But this just 
isn’t true. First off, if this were the case, Sellars would not have tried to give us a 
transcendental argument that picturing is a presupposition of the empirical 
meaningfulness of a representational system. Second, there is no single way in which we 
map or picture reality. There may be a kind of instinctive or hard-wired form of mapping 
built into our sensibility, but there are as many different forms of conceptual maps or 
pictures of reality as there are conceptual frameworks that we evolve and then develop. It 
is ironic that he thinks that Sellars assumes that picturing is “the inalienable prerogative 
of the perceptual level” (SM V ¶82: 144; quoted by Reider on 41 and 53). For Sellars 
rejects this idea: this is one of the points that separates him from the instrumentalist. 
Sellars thinks that picturing, at its best, is the prerogative of the theoretical level, and that 
is why he is a scientific realist. Of course, since Sellars rejects a hard-and-fast distinction 
between the language of observation and the language of theory, picturing will always be 
one of the functions of perceptual states — but it is not a function solely or ideally of 
perceptual states.  
 
Sellars must not be shoved into a Procrustean bed structured by the old “new way of 
ideas” that claimed we know mental occurrences first and best and must infer from that 
knowledge to any knowledge we might be able to gain about external reality or things in 
themselves. Sellars rejected that old form of representationalism, just as Hegel did. We 
are a part of the world, engaged with it, engaged, indeed, with things as they are in 
themselves. The more in tune we are with the world, the more we can understand and 
explain it in its multi-dimensional complexity, the more right we have to accept the 
higher-order belief that we grasp things as they are in themselves. It is the explanatory 
adequacy of our conception of the world that really grounds our ontological confidence in 
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that conception. Picturing plays a role in explaining the explanatory adequacy of our 




Sellars’s realism is in tension with his Kantian approach to conceptuality to the degree 
that we want to keep the notion of reality connected to that of truth. The picturing 
relation that plays an indispensable role in tying our conceptual activity to the world in 
which we live is a sub-conceptual relation. Pictures are neither truth nor false. Pictures 
are also inarticulate: some language use may picture, but pictures, it turns out, cannot be 
said, at least not as such. Yet the concept of an object turns out, for Sellars, to be 
framework- or language-dependent. This must be just as true for the objects of ultimate 
science as for the objects of the manifest image. Sellars paints for us a picture of ultimate 
reality as a Tractarian/Humean extreme: just one damn thing after another. Causal 
relations — any property or relation that contains some modal force — are not ‘in the 
objects’, but expressions of how we, in our conceptual dealings, recognize commitments 
and entitlements to utilize and transform our representations. So, one might say, 
everything formal, which is almost everything interesting, is mind-dependent. In order 
properly to pressure Sellars on these points, however, Reider needs to leave behind the 
Cartesian new way of ideas and recognize that a different mode of thought is in play in 
Sellars, precisely because he adopts a Kantian and sometimes even post-Kantian 
approach. 
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